The economic forum Vladimir Putin designed as proof that Western sanctions had failed to cripple Russia opened and closed against the same backdrop: plumes of smoke and air-raid warnings. On Wednesday, June 3, 2026, the opening day of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), a Ukrainian drone set an oil terminal in the city ablaze, while other strikes targeted warships at the Baltic Fleet base in Kronstadt. Three days later, on the closing day, St. Petersburg came under attack again. The Kremlin had cast the forum as a stage to sell stability. Kyiv chose those same days to advertise the opposite.
Two waves timed to bracket the forum
What sets these strikes apart from the daily fighting along the front is not the number of drones but the choreography. Ukraine did not hit St. Petersburg on random dates. The first wave landed on the day SPIEF opened; the second on the day it closed. In between, thousands of invited guests gathered at the Expoforum to hear speeches about the resilience of the Russian economy.
On the opening night, Russia's Defense Ministry claimed it intercepted 354 drones across more than 15 regions. St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov said several facilities were damaged, with some people injured and no deaths. Serhii Sternenko, an adviser to Ukraine's Defense Ministry, summed up the moment dryly: "The Petersburg forum is opening with a nice plume of black smoke in the background after Ukrainian strikes."
The second wave came on Saturday, June 6. This time the Russian Defense Ministry said it had downed 376 drones nationwide overnight, with Leningrad Region Governor Aleksandr Drozdenko reporting that 86 of them fell in his territory. The targets widened: a naval arsenal, the Kronstadt base, and an oil depot in the Krasnodar region some 500 kilometers from the front line. Drozdenko offered only a terse comment: "Combat operations continue."
These figures warrant caution. The claims of 354 and 376 drones downed come entirely from Russian authorities and have not been independently verified, as has the scale of damage to the oil terminal and the assets at Kronstadt. In this war both sides have an incentive to inflate or play down the numbers, which makes satellite imagery and open-source (OSINT) analysis more reliable than ministry press releases.
'Long-range sanctions,' not just an exchange of fire
It was Kyiv's framing that turned these strikes from a military incident into an economic message. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy described the deep-strike operation as "long-range sanctions," a deliberate choice of words that places the drones in the logic of a trade war rather than an artillery duel.
"Our long-range sanctions also reached about 500 kilometers into the Krasnodar region," Zelenskyy said, referring to the oil depot hit in the second wave. In a separate statement he added: "Russia must end its war and stop its attacks on life. Any manifestation of injustice against Ukraine will receive a just response."
The logic behind the phrase is plain. Drones that traveled roughly 1,000 kilometers to reach St. Petersburg, Russia's second-largest city and the heart of its Baltic Fleet, show that Ukraine's deep-strike capability has matured. Regions long considered beyond the war's reach are now within range. For the would-be investors seated at the forum, that threat is no longer abstract.
A showcase turned vulnerability
SPIEF is no ordinary gathering for the Kremlin. Putin promotes it as evidence that Western isolation has failed, a stage to showcase partnerships with the Global South and draw in foreign capital. This year the forum aimed for some 20,000 guests from 130 countries. The Kremlin's economic envoy, Kirill Dmitriev, sold that narrative with confidence: "The countries of the Global South are building up their economic strength, actively moving toward partnership with Russia and will be strongly represented."
This is where Ukraine's strikes find their force. It is hard to convince foreign financiers that Russia is a safe place to park their money when the skies over the forum's host city fill with sirens and flight operations at Pulkovo Airport are disrupted during the attacks. The material damage may be limited, but the reputational damage strikes at the very message SPIEF was built to deliver. Ukraine, in other words, does not need to flatten the forum. It is enough to make its security a question mark in front of delegates from 130 countries.
The paradox of the oil campaign
Through 2026, Ukraine has intensified its strikes on Russian refineries and oil infrastructure to erode the energy export revenue that funds its war machine. There are signs the campaign is biting. Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak acknowledged a decline: "Russia's oil production is indeed lower compared to the beginning of 2026." Zelenskyy went further, claiming Russia had lost at least US$7 billion since the start of the year because of attacks on its oil sector, though that figure comes from the Ukrainian side and has not been independently verified.
Yet here lies an irony that rarely draws attention. Hitting Russia's oil supply while global prices are high does not automatically hurt the Kremlin's coffers. An escalating crisis around Iran and the Gulf has pushed world oil prices up, and that rise, combined with a partial easing of US sanctions in that context, has patched over some of the lost revenue. Moscow can sell smaller volumes at much higher prices and still take in plenty. The drone campaign meant to choke off its income is being partly neutralized by market forces beyond either side's control.
The events also need to be kept separate. The June 3 strike on the St. Petersburg oil terminal was its own incident. It differs from the repeated drone attacks on the Kirishi refinery, which has a capacity of 400,000 barrels per day and sits near St. Petersburg, and which has been targeted again and again this year, but on other dates. Conflating the two would overstate the impact of a single night.
Why this matters for Indonesia
For readers in Indonesia, the most concrete thread in this story is not the smoke over St. Petersburg but the price at the pump. The combination of disrupted Russian supply and a risk premium around the Strait of Hormuz could keep world oil prices elevated into the second half of 2026. As a net fuel importer, Indonesia feels that pressure directly through its import bill, energy subsidy costs, and the rupiah exchange rate. Every sustained rise in oil prices adds to the state budget (APBN) and squeezes household purchasing power, far from the battlefield that set it off.
A second layer touches economic diplomacy. The "partnership with Russia" narrative that Dmitriev sold at SPIEF is also aimed at Asian economies, including an Indonesia that pursues a free and active foreign policy and remains open to cooperation across blocs. The question is how convincing a partnership offer can be from a country whose own flagship forum can be disrupted by drones. That credibility, not just a burning oil terminal, is the real target of Kyiv's "long-range sanctions."
What to watch
A few variables will determine whether this chapter is merely symbolic or carries real weight. First, the reaction of the oil market: whether the disruption to Russian supply and Gulf tensions genuinely lock prices at high levels, with a direct knock-on effect to Indonesia's energy costs. Second, the pattern of Russian retaliation, which has often answered strikes on St. Petersburg with large missile and drone barrages against Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities; that cycle bears watching for signs of flaring up again. Third, and most fundamental, independent verification of both sides' claims. Until satellite imagery and OSINT analysis weigh in against the official figures, the true scale of the damage, and with it the strategic weight of these strikes, hangs between two versions, each with an interest of its own.
